filiated agencies" are directly prohibited from selling property insurance and those in which they would be indirectly prohibited from doing so under arguably applicable insurance statutes. The comment argues that the latter should be construed to permit savings and loans to qualify as property insurance agents. It then analyzes the effects of allowing savings and loans to act as insurance agents and concludes that there are strong policy reasons for eliminating direct prohibitions of that activity.
I. EXISTING STATUTES
The power of a savings and loan association to act as an insurance agent is initially a function of the source of its charter, since the powers granted to federally chartered associations by the federal government may differ from those granted to state chartered associations by the states. In addition, regulation of the sale of property insurance by a savings and loan association may vary depending on whether the sale is made by the association itself, by a service corporation in which the association has invested, or by a subsidiary of a savings and loan holding company. Thus, analysis of existing regulation of the sale property insurance by savings and loan associations must identify both the source of the charter and the identity of the sales agent.
A. State Chartered Savings and Loan Associations 1. The Association as an Insurance Agent. Although most savings and loan association charters 9 do not expressly grant the power to sell insurance, 10 courts have held that an association's incidental powers-those reasonably necessary to accomplish an association's express objectivesn"-include the power to sell property insurance 8. The term affiliated agencies will be used in this comment to refer to service corporations, subsidiaries of savings and loan holding companies, and agencies owned by officers and directors of the association. 9. State chartered savings and loan associations are nearly always in corporate form. In re Puget Sound Say. & Loan Ass'n, 49 F.2d 922, 923-24 (W.D. Wash. 1931 44, 51 (1959) .
10. Conversation with Mr. Donald Weeks, Assistant Counsel, U.S. Savings and Loan League, 1974. 11. All state chartered savings and loan associations possess general incidental powers, either by specific legislation, W. PRATHER, SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 606 (4th ed. 1970); see, e.g., on the collateral securing a loan. 12 Nevertheless, several state statutes may prevent the savings and loan association from acting as an insurance agent. State insurance agent licensing statutes in five states, for example, specifically prohibit a savings and loan from obtaining a license to sell property insurance, 13 and eight others require the insurance agent applicant to be a natural person.' 4 In the remaining jurisdictions, however, savings and loans can apparently qualify under statutes regulating the types of parties that may become agents. 15 State antirebate statutes constitute another source of licensing regulation. These statutes, which exist in thirty-eight states, prohibit the payment of rebates or other consideration to induce the 12. Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass 'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 27-28 (D.D.C. 1970) ; Kerrigan v. Unity Say. Ass 'n, 58 Ill. 2d 20, 25-27, 317 N.E.2d 39, 42-43 (1974) ; Chicago Bldg. Soc 'y v. Crowell, 65 Ill. 453, 457-58 (1872) .
13. CAL. FIN. CODE § 5500 (West 1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 1514-A (1974) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 174E (Supp. 1974 20-282 (1956) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2802 (1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-72 (Supp. 1974) ; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 1702 (Spec. Insurance Pamphlet 1971); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 431-368 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE § 41-1021 41- (Supp. 1974 ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.37 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4501 (1965) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.9-020 (1972) ; LA. REV. STAT. § 22-1161 (1959) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 168(d) (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-3302 (1947) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 683A.030 (1973) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-5-23 (1953) ; N.Y. INS. LAW § 115(2) (McKinney 1966) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-39.4 (1965) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § § 3905.01, 3905.05 (Anderson 1970) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1301 (1958) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 744.135 (1974) ; PA. STAT. tit. 40, § 231 (1971) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-231.1 (Supp. 1973 31-17-9 (2) (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-280 (1970) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 48.17.090 (1961) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-154 (1967) . But it should be noted that Nevada and New York prohibit a subsidiary that provides services for a savings and loan from selling property insurance. NEV. REV. STAT. § 673.2765(1) (1973) ; N.Y. INS. LAW § 7-b (McKinney Supp. 1974) . It is unlikely that a savings and loan association could qualify as an insurance agent in Nevada and New York within the scope of the term "corporations"; otherwise, an association would be prohibited from selling insurance through a subsidiary, but permitted to do so directly.
Although purchase of property insurance. 16 These statutes restrict competition by prohibiting agents from offering to return to policyholders a portion of the commissions they have earned as an inducement to purchase the insurance through them.' 7 It can be argued that because a savings and loan association acting as an insurance agent might distribute a portion of its commissions, through interest payments to depositors or dividends to stockholders, to some persons who have purchased insurance from it, the savings and loan would violate the antirebate statute.' 8 Establishing a violation of the statute, however, would require proof that the alleged rebate actually induced the purchase of insurance through the savings and loan association, rather than through another agent.' 9 It is unlikely that the uncertain prospect of a minimal and diluted increase in distributed earnings would provide the requisite inducement. 17. See, e.g., Arcim Corp. v. Pink, 253 App. Div. 428, 429, 2 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (1938 ), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 721, 21 N.E.2d 213 (1939 307-09, 312 (1927) . See also Smith v. Kleinschmidt, 57 Mont. 237, 245, 187 P. 894, 896 (1920) . 18. Cf. Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 35 (D.D.C. 1970) ; People ex rel. Troxell v. Baylor, 15 I1. App. 3d 815, 819-20, 305 N.E.2d 15, 19 (1973 
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The University of Chicago Law Review [42:182 or place more than a designated percentage of his insurance on controlled business, 2 2 which is usually broadly defined to include insurance sales on the property of the agent, his relatives, his employees or employer, or of members, officers, and directors if the agent is an organization. These statutes create an irrebuttable presumption of illegal rebating when more than the designated percentage of an agent's insurance sales are to controlled parties. 2 3 The purpose of these statutes, like that of antirebate statutes, is to minimize the number of licenses granted to applicants that intend to obtain insurance for themselves or persons or organizations beneficially connected with them at effective prices lower than those stated in the policies. 24 Since the diluted return of insurance commissions through distributions of earnings by a savings and 22. Thirty-seven states have enacted controlled business statutes. ALA. CODE tit. 28A, § 120 (7) 24. Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 33-34 (D.D.C. 1970 ); Quetnick v. McConnell, 154 Cal. App. 2d 112, 116-17, 315 P.2d 718, 721 (1957) ; Florida Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Larson, 155 Fla. 13, 14, 19 So.2d 414, 415 (1944 A minority view is that the purpose of controlled business statutes is to prevent the diversion of insurance business from full-time agents by part-time agents who gain access to insurance purchasers through the sale of other products and services. See Jarus v. Robinson, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 510, 512, 133 N.E.2d 441, 442-43 (C.P. 1954 328-29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) , which states that the purpose of the controlled business statute in question is to preserve free choice in the selection of insurance agents. It is arguable that in the jurisdictions accepting the minority rule, it loan association would probably not induce the purchase of insurance from the association, a controlled business statute's presumption of illegal rebating is inappropriate in the savings and loan context. 25 In fact, twelve states have enacted provisions that specifically exempt insurance sales generated by mortgage transactions from their controlled business statutes. 26 In states without such provisions, controlled business statutes should be construed to allow a savings and loan association to act as an insurance agent. 27 Finally, two states have enacted statutes that prohibit the licensing of an applicant that has no intention of deriving a major portion of its income from insurance sales. 28 A savings and loan association is apparently unable to qualify for an insurance agent license in states that have enacted these primary occupation statutes. 2 9 would be proper to deny a savings and loan a license under a controlled business statute, since it would be especially easy for the savings and loan to divert insurance sales to itself. On the uniquely advantageous access that savings and loans have to borrowers, see text and notes at notes 66 & 69 infra. 25. "[A]ny benefits, direct or indirect, to the individual members of the savings and loan association who pay the insurance premiums are so remote as to be inconsequential." Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 34 (D.D.C. 1970 (1961) . To interpret these terms to include savings and loan associations and their borrowers and depositors would mean that a savings and loan association could qualify for a license only if it expected to write less than the designated percentage-for example, thirty-three and one-third percent in Illinois-of its insurance on the property or risks of borrowers and depositors-an unlikely commercial prospect. See People ex rel. Troxell v. Baylor, 15 Ill. App. 3d 815, 819, 305 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1973) ; Kerrigan v. Unity Sav. Ass 'n, 11 Ill. App. 3d 766, 772, 297 N.E.2d 699, 703 (1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 58 Il1. 2d 20, 317 N.E.2d 39 (1974) . Of course, there is no reason to interpret these undefined terms to include savings and loan associations and their borrowers and depositors if one accepts the majority (antirebate) interpretation of the purpose of controlled business regulation. See text and note at note 24 supra.
28. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § § 168(a), (d) (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1 7 :22-6.9(g) (1970 In summary, state chartered savings and loan associations are directly prohibited from acting as insurance agents in fourteen states. 3 0 Antirebate and controlled business statutes, although they arguably prohibit such activity indirectly in other states, should not be construed to do so.
2. Investment in a Service Corporation that Functions as an Insurance Agent. Several states have enacted legislation that authorizes state chartered savings and loan associations to invest in service corporations that perform a variety of clerical, accounting, and related services. 3 1 This legislation usually enumerates several activities that a service corporation may engage in without authoriapplicant's primary occupation consideration of any portion of the agent's business having a connection with a corporation "whose principal business is lending of money." But an applicant for an agent's license must also be a natural person under New Jersey law, and a savings and loan association could thus not qualify. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:22-6.1 (1970) . 30. The fourteen states include the five that specifically prohibit savings and loans from obtaining licenses, the eight that require applicants to be natural persons, and the two that have enacted primary occupation statutes, of which New Jersey also has enacted a natural person applicant requirement.
31. Seventeen states have enacted statutes expressly authorizing investment in service "corporations." ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-446 (5) (1974) (Supp. 1974) . This comment will use the term service corporation to refer to both service corporations and service organizations.
Several states have also enacted "tie-in" statutes that define the investment powers of state savings and loan associations according to the investment powers that can be exercised by a federal association domiciled in that state. (analyzing the thirty-two tie-in statutes on record in 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-1409 45- (Supp. 1974 . It is important to note that these statutes add nothing to the preexisting authority of state associations to invest in service corporations that sell insurance, because federal statutes authorize federal associations to invest in service corporations only when an association chartered by the state in which the federal association is domiciled is permitted to do so under state law. zation from the savings and loan commissioner. 3 2 Although seven states' statutes expressly exclude the sale of property insurance from those activities, 3 3 none of the others expressly authorizes service corporations to sell insurance. Each statute, however, confers discretion upon the state savings and loan commissioner to determine what nonspecified activities may be undertaken, and several state commissioners have authorized the sale of property insurance by service corporations. 3 4 The validity of a commissioner's determination depends upon whether the statutory delegation of legislative decision making power contains adequate standards to guide the commissioner in exercising his discretion. Statutes that confer authority upon the commissioner without providing any standards are subject to strong constitutional challenge. 3 5 When standards are provided, however, it is difficult to determine how extensive they must be for the delegation to be valid; a coherent definition of "adequate standards" has thus far eluded the state courts. 36 At least some courts have construed the requirement broadly, upholding legislation providing only extremely nonspecific standards. 3 7 It could also be argued that a commissioner would lack authority to permit service corporations to sell property insurance in states that have enacted antirebate statutes, controlled business statutes, or primary occupation statutes. But if the application of antirebate and controlled business statutes to savings arid loan associations that sell insurance themselves is unjustified in light of the purpose of the statutes, they should not be applied to prevent the sale of property insurance by service corporations, since the same dilution of commissions through distribution of earnings would occur. Furthermore, although primary occupation statutes directly prohibit savings and loans from acting as insurance agents, it is possible to structure the activities of a service corporation to enable it to escape that prohibition. 3 8 Thus, in the seven states that expressly prohibit service corporations from selling property insurance, in eight others that require an insurance agent applicant to be a natural person, 39 and in those other states in which statutes permitting authorization of 41-42 & n.11 (1973) ("safety" held adequate, citing other cases holding "best interest of educational system" and "blighted" adequate).
Some courts have substituted a requirement of procedural and judicial safeguards against improper agency action for the adequate standards requirement. See, e.g., Motyka v. McCorkle, 58 N.J. 165, 177-78, 276 A.2d 129, 135-36 (1971 REV. 294, 298-302 (1937) .
Where, however, there is clear evidence of a legislative intent that service corporations be allowed to sell property insurance, service corporation statutes may be construed as impliedly repealing prior restrictions that might have been interpreted to prevent these corporations from acting as insurance agents, although there is a strong presumption against repeal by implication. insurance sales by state savings and loan commissioners are subject to invalidation as unconstitutional delegations of legislative power, savings and loan service corporations are prohibited from acting as insurance agents.
3. Subsidiaries of Savings and Loan Holding Companies as Insurance Agents. The Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967 (Holding Company Amendments) 40 authorize a holding company 41 to operate subsidiaries that sell insurance. 42 But the effect of these Amendments on existing state regulation of the sale of property insurance by state chartered savings and loan associations is governed by section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act (McCarran-Ferguson Act) ,' 4 which provides that no federal statute shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede state statutes that regulate the business of insurance unless the federal statute itself "specifically relates to the business of insurance. 4 4 In SEC v. National Securiment Regulations that expressly allow service corporations to act as insurance agents, but limit service corporations' powers to those permitted under state law). Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § § 209.04(1), (6) 42. The Holding Company Amendments distinguish between a savings and loan holding company and a multiple savings and loan holding company; the former controls "an insured institution" while the latter controls "two or more insured institutions." 12 U.S.C. § § 1730a(a)(1)(D), (E) (1970) . An insured institution is one whose accounts are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). 12 U.S.C. § 1724(a) (1970) . Approximately sixty-six percent of all state chartered associations controlling almost ninety-four percent of the assets held by state chartered associations, are FSLICinsured. See FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 57-58. Although the Holding Company Amendments contain a provision restricting the activity of multiple holding companies, 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(c)(2) (1970). they expressly allow a multiple holding company to control a noninsured subsidiary that sells insurance. Id. § 1730a(c)(2)(B). There are no provisions in the Holding Company Amendments that either permit or prohibit an insured subsidiary of a multiple savings and loan company, or any subsidiary of a holding company controlling only one insured institution, from engaging in this activity.
43. Act of Mar. 9, 1945, ch. 20, § 2(b) ties, Inc., 4 5 the Supreme Court noted that the core of the "business of insurance" is the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder. 46 Thus, although the Holding Company Amendments relate to "insurance" in that they authorize control over subsidiaries that act as insurance agents, they do not relate to the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The central concern of the Amendments is the regulation of the investment activities of holding companies, not the licensing of insurance agents, which the Court held to be an activity within the business of insurance. 47 Consequently, if a state statute prohibits the issuance of an insurance agent license to the subsidiary of a savings and loan holding company, the state statute governs, and the Holding Company Act Amendments' authorization of investment in insurance agent subsidiaries could not be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede it. Moreover, a savings and loan holding company would be unable to operate an insurance agent subsidiary in states that merely prohibit a savings and loan association from investing in a service corporation that sells insurance. The Holding Company Amendments explicitly prohibit a savings and loan holding company and its subsidiaries other than insured savings and loans from performing services for the purpose or with the effect of evading state laws or regulations applicable to insured subsidiaries of the holding company. 4 8 45. 393 U.S. 453 (1960). 46. Id. at 460. 47. Id. 48. 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(c)(1) (1970) . Ownership of an insurance agency by a savings and loan holding company is apparently common. See Hearings on S. 1542 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1967) (testimony that nine of the ten member holding companies of the Council of Savings and Loan Stock Companies controlled at least one insurance agency subsidiary).
More than eighty percent of the assets controlled by savings and loan holding companies are located in California. S. REP. No. 354, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967) . Although no California statute prohibits a non-savings and loan subsidiary from selling insurance, see CAL. FIN. CODE § § 11500-11650 (West 1968 ), § § 11700-11708 (West Supp. 1974) , the state's insurance agent licensing statutes prevent both a savings and loan, CAL. FIN. CODE § 5500 (West 1968), and its service corporations, CAL. FIN. CODE § 6702.1 (West 1968), from obtaining licenses. Thus, permitting a savings and loan holding company to operate a non-savings and loan subsidiary that sells insurance would circumvent the state's policy against insurance sales by savings and loan associations and their service corporations and should be prohibited. Cf. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 430 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971) (one bank holding company forced to give up its armored car service because ownership of that service by a bank would have violated the state's branch banking laws).
[42:182 B. Federal Associations 1. The Association as an Insurance Agent. The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 4 9 which provides for the incorporation and regulation of federal savings and loan associations, 5 " does not specifically authorize a federal association to function as an insurance agent. Nor does the Act expressly grant a federal association those incidental powers reasonably necessary to accomplish its express objects and purposes. 5 1 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) has construed its own powers under the Act as including the power to grant federal associations a wide range of incidental powers, 5 2 but it has interpreted those powers to exclude the authority to sell property insurance. 53 As a result, federally chartered savings and loan associations, constituting almost thirty-nine percent of all associations and holding fiftysix percent of the industry's assets, 54 are prohibited from acting as property insurance agents.
2. Investment in a Service Corporation that Functions as an Insurance Agent. The Home Owners' Loan Act was amended in 1964 generally to allow federal associations to invest in service corporations, 55 and the FHLBB has issued a regulation specifically authorizing investment by a federal association in a service corporation that markets property insurance. 5 6 This regulation, however, can-49. 12 U.S.C. § § 1461 etseq. (1970) . 50. All federal associations receive their charters from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970) , and are organized in mutual corporate form. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 544.1 (1974) . These associations are required to have their accounts insured by the FSLIC, 12 U.S.C. § 1726(b) (1970), and they automatically become members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(f) (1970) , which serves as a central bank to supplement the resources of member associations. See 12 U.S.C. § § 1429-31 (1970) .
51. This is in contrast to Congress's specific grant to national banks of "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking . 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
52. See 12 C.F.R. § 544.1 (1974) (FHLBB charter provision regulations). An earlier charter (Charter K), under which many federal associations still operate, also grants similarly broad powers. See 24 C.F.R. § 202.9(a) (1938) .
53. Opinion of Legal Department, FHLBB, May 26, 1936, excerpted in NAIA STUDY, supra note 41, at 10; Letter from Charles E. Allen, General Counsel, FHLBB, Washington, D.C., June 6, 1974 . See Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 28 (D.D.C. 1970 . There is an indication in some FHLBB opinion letters, however, that an association could operate as an agent if no other reasonable means to insure the property securing the loan were available. See NAIA STUDY, supra note 41, at 10-12. 54 . See FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 58. 55. Act of Sept. 2, 1964 , Pub. L. No. 88-560, tit. IX, § 905, 78 Stat. 805, 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (c) (1970 .
56. 12 C.F.R. § 545.9-1(a)(4)(xi) (1974) .
not authorize a federal association to invest in a service corporation that markets property insurance if state chartered associations in the state in which the federal association is domiciled lack comparable investment authority. The 1964 amendment, as originally introduced, 57 contained a provision authorizing federal associations to invest in service corporations subject to "rules and regulations of the Board .. *"58
The "rules and regulations" limitation was eventually deleted, 5 9 thus clearly indicating that Congress had no intention of giving the FHLBB the authority to limit a federal association's power to invest in a service corporation. Under the amendment, a federal association was to have the same power to invest in a service corporation as a state association doing business in the same jurisdiction . 6 0 Moreover, the 1964 amendment of the Home Owners' Loan Act, like the Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967,61 is not a statute regulating the business of insurance within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The 1964 57. H.R. 12175, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964 . The bill was introduced on July 30, 1964. 110 CONG. REC. 17479 (1964) .
58. 110 CONG. REc. 19332 (1964) . The amendment originated in a 1961 bill introduced by Representative Addonizio of New Jersey. H.R. 8647, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); 107 CONG. REc. 15393 (1961) . Although that bill would have been applicable to all federal savings and loan associations, it was introduced in response to a particular problem that existed in New Jersey. Federal associations in that state had no authority to invest in the Central Corporation of Savings and Loan Associations, which was wholly owned by state chartered associations and which provided member associations with various services related to mortgage transactions. Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE L.J. 1271 , 1292 n.74 (1966 .
59. 110 CONG. REC. 19332-33 (1964) . The limitation on the size of authorized investments was also reduced from two percent to one percent of the association's assets, thereby allegedly reducing the need for FHLBB restriction of a federal association's service corporation activities. Id.
Although both the House and Senate committee reports indicate an intention to limit service corporation activities, H.R. REP. No. 1703 , 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1964 , S. REP. No. 1265 , 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1964 , both reports had been completed before the elimination of the "rules and regulations" clause. See HousE REPORT, supra at 27; SENATE REPORT, supra at 54. 60. 110 CONG. REC. 19333 (1964) (remarks of Representative Widnall, sponsor of the amendment). Congress had in other cases limited service corporation powers by express statutory provisions. The Bank Corporation Act, for example, limits the function of certain bank service corporations to clerical and data processing services. Pub. L. 87-856, Oct. 23, 1962 amendment authorizes federal associations to undertake certain investment activity and makes no attempt to regulate the licensing of insurance agents. Thus, it is not open to a construction, either on its face or under regulations promulgated by the FHLBB, 62 that would impair state insurance agent licensing laws. As a result, a federal association cannot operate a service corporation that sells property insurance if the state in which it is domiciled prohibits a service corporation from selling property insurance.
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II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Although several state insurance agent licensing statutes may apply indirectly to savings and loan associations, their service corporations, and their holding company subsidiaries, this comment has argued that such regulations should be construed to permit the sale of property insurance by these parties. Other regulations directly prohibit the sale of property insurance by state and federally chartered associations and their service corporations. There are several policy grounds that would support the elimination of these restrictions.
The sale of property insurance by a savings and loan association or an affiliate located on its premises, for example, provides increased convenience to the consumer. 64 The purchase of a home 65 usually requires three transactions: the procurement of a mortgage, the actual purchase of the real estate, and the purchase of property insurance. If the savings and loan association acting as mortgagee is permitted to sell the insurance, the consumer's purchase would require only two transactions. 66 Integration of the loan purchase with the insurance transaction may also reduce the total cost of providing insurance. Certain information required in mortgage transactions is used in preparing insurance policies, and costs would be reduced whenever the loan personnel could use the initial information to determine the insurable value of the property. 67 Elimination of restrictions on insurance sales by savings and loan associations will probably increase the number of competing insurance agents, and this increased competition may benefit the consumer. First, it may result in an increase in the quality of various services, such as analysis of client needs, recommendation for coverage, selection of an insurer, and assistance in claim settlement at the time of loss. Second, if increased competition among agents results in a reduction in the size of their commissions, it will probably lead to lower premium charges. 6 8 Although these potential benefits of allowing savings and loan associations to act as insurance agents may justify elimination of the various existing licensing restrictions, it provides no justification for allowing savings and loan associations, if they can legally act as agents, to condition the extension of a property loan on the purchase of insurance from the association or an affiliated agency. 6 9 There has been some dispute over whether tying arrangements should be viewed as an exclusionary practice or as a monopoly profit maximization device; 7 0 nevertheless, they are generally recognized as having anticompetitive effects. Over twenty-five states have already enacted statutes that prohibit coninsurance and thus serve all of a customer's insurance needs, rather than to prohibit the institutipn from selling any insurance. Hearings on the Credit Crunch and Reform of Financial Institutions Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 867-68 (1973) ditioning the extension of credit upon the purchase of insurance at a designated agency. 7 1 Similar federal regulations have been proposed to prohibit the use of tying arrangements by FSLIC-insured institutions. 7 2 The federal antitrust laws may also be applicable, since the McCarran-Ferguson Act expressly provides that they apply to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law. 73 The coverage of federal antitrust laws, however, is limited. 7 4 Moreover, any statutes prohibiting tying arrangements are difficult to enforce because of the apparently widespread use of subtle coercion rather than explicit tying requirements. (1970) . One federal court has held that federal antitrust laws apply without limitation, since the fact that an insurance policy is the tied product does not bring the tying arrangement within the meaning of the "business of insurance," nor therefore within exclusive state regulation under the Act. Fry v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1151 , 1154 (N.D. Tex. 1973 ; see SEC v. National Securities Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 458-60 (1969) . But see Note, Federal Regulation of Insurance Companies: The Disappearing McCarran Act Exemption, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1340 , 1352 . Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), is probably inapplicable, since money-lending is not one of the underlying transactions covered by the Act. See United States v. Investor Diversified Servs., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645, 647-49 (D. Minn. 1952) , vacated on other grounds by consent decree, TRADE REG. RE'. (1954 Trade Cas.) 67,799, at 69,574 (D. Minn. June 30, 1954 . Section 5(a)(6) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970), which prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, specifically exempts banks from its coverage. One court has held that the reason for the exemption was that banks are subject to the direction and control of a separate commission largely similar to that of the Federal Trade Commission. T.C. Hurst & Son v. FTC, 268 F. 874, 877 (E.D. Va. 1920) . This rationale has equal force when applied to federal savings and loan associations. The FHLBB has powers over federal asociations similar to those exercised by the Federal Reserve Board over national banks, see T. MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 20, 57 (1969), and the FSLIC plays a role analogous to that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See id. at 5, 84-86. Moreover, seventy-one percent of all state associations, controlling ninetyfive percent of the assets held by state asociations, are subject to federal regulation either as a member of the FHLB system, or as an FSLIC-insured institution as well. See FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 57-58, 111-12; 12 U.S.C. § § 1464(a), 1725(a) (1970).
Finally, section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C .  § 1 (1970) , may have only minimal impact on these tying arrangements because it has been interpreted to require that the violator have had substantial market power over the tying product and have restrained a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce. See 75. Associations rarely declare explicitly that the borrower has to purchase the required insurance through a designated agency to obtain the loan; the lender probably relies more upon subtle hints. Herman, supra note 4, at 854-855; Kimball & Jackson, 
